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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
MARY JANE REECE PHILLIPS, ,. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WENDELL BENNETT, Adm. of the ) 
Estate of ONEITA S. WOLFE, de-
ceased, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 11010 
APPELLANT'S IRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken by the Appellant from the judg-
ment of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
in and for Ut:ah County, State of Utah. 
BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant is of the opinion that the trial court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard payment 
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of plaintiff's medical expenses by a third party, and that 
such failure to instruct was prejudicial error. Appellant 
seeks a new trial. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Is it prejudicial error for a trial court to allow in eVl-
dence the payment of medical benefits by plaintiff's in· 
surer and to refuse an instruction to the jury that such 
evidence must not be considered in evaluating plaintiff's 
damages? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 10, 1964, appellant, Mrs. Phillips, a res-
ident of Springville, Utah, was involved in an automobile 
collision at Fourth South and State Street in Provo, Utah. 
Respondent ran his automobile into the back of appellant's 
car causing damage to the car and personal injuries to 
appellant. The day following the accident, app2llant re-
ported to Dr. N. 0. Parker of Springville for treatment of 
pain in her neck and back regions. After a series of visits 
by the appellant to his office, Dr. Parker referred appel-
lant to Dr. E. H. Chapman, an orthopedic surgeon prac-
ticing in Provo, Utah, for further treatment. Dr. Chap-
man placed the appellant in Utah Valley Hospital, which 
hospitalraation continued from January 20 to January 27, 
of 1965. Although released from the hospital, appellant 
continued to e~perience pain and suffering as a result of 
her injury. 
On March 11, 1965, appellant was involved in a very 
minor accident in which she backed her automQlbile into a 
utility pole at a grocery store. She reported the accident 
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t'J Dr. Chapman at his office the next day. Mrs. Phillips 
te;.;tified that the second accident was of minor conse-
quence, that while she had a temporary inflammation of 
r1er condition it shortly returned to the condition which 
!Jrevailed before the second accident and that she continued 
at the plateau of recovery reached from her first injury 
!Page 20 of the Record). Dr. Chapman stated that he 
did not attach great significance to the second accident 
a.nd that substantially all of the appellant's injuries oc-
cw-red in the first accident (Page 62 of Record). 
Cowl.sel for the defendant in his argument to the jury 
emphasized the second accident. The substance of his ar-
io;w m·nt was that one could not adequately apportion as be-
twet'n the first and second accident the damages occurring 
subsequent to the second accident. Consequently, he ar-
~;wxl, the jury should award the appellant only those ex-
penses and general damages sustained subsequent to the 
first, but prior to the second accident. It was his calcu-
btion that the appellant had sustained only damages of 
$410.54 as follows: 
Exhibit # 
2 N. L. Parker, M.D. 
(Professional Services 11/11/64-1/13/65) 35.00 
;j J. R. Monnahan, M.D. 
(X-Ray Services 11/18/64) 25.00 
4 Utah Valley Hospital 
(Hospitalization 1/20/65-1/27/65) 263.50 
8 E. H. Chapman, M.D. 
(Professional Services 1/14/65-1/27/65) 55.00 
9 Deon's, Inc. 
(Cervical Pillow) 6.16 
10 Deon's, Inc. 
(Traction Device) 
4 
25.88 
$410.54 
Counsel for plaintiff, arguing that in view of the minor 
nature of the second accident all plaintiff's medical and 
hospital expenses should be included, calculated additional 
special damages as follows: 
Exhibit # 
5 Utah Valley Hospital 
(Physical Therapy and Related Services 
4/2/65---5/7 /67) $424.50 
7 Utah Valley Hospital 
(Hospitalization 9/16/66-9/25/66) 372.25 
8 E. H. Chapman, M.D. 
(Professional Services 3/12/65-6/30/67l 84.00 
Add Defendant's Calculation: $410.54 
$1291.29 
There were thus two theories of special damages 
given, respectively, $410.54 and $1291.29. Disregarding 
this evidence, however, the jury brought back a verdict 
of special damages in the amount of $500.00 (See page 73 
of the Record). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT THEY WERE NOT TO CONSIDER 
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~tr:DICAL OR HOSPITAL BENEFITS PAID BY BLUE 
CROSS-BLUE SHIELD OR ANY OTHER THIRD PAR-
TY. 
During the course of the trial, it became necessary to 
introduce hospital records, which records had notations 
reflecting payment by Blue ~ (Exhibits 4, 5 and 7). 
At the time these records were introduced in evidence, 
appellant's counsel had an off the record conference with 
the court and respondent's coWlSel concerning the neces-
sity of an instruction to the jury as to how to treat these 
' records in the light of such notations The court requested 
counsel for the app2llant to submit an instruction for its 
consideration, which was done at the beginning of the sec-
ond day of trial. 
Afte-r both sides had rested, counsel for the appellant 
argued the merits of submitting requested instructions 
· relating to payments by a third party to the jury, but the 
court refused the request. It is submitted that this re-
fusal was error on the part of the Judge and was so pre-
judicial in its nature that a new trial should be granted to 
the appellant. 
It is a well settled rule of law that the amount recov-
' erable by an injured person in a tortious personal injury 
case is not decreased by the fact that the injured party 
has been wholly or partly indemnified for the loss by P~ 
ceeds from accident insurance. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Staley, 28 Cal 2d 347, 170 P 2d 448, 166 ALR 198 (recog-
rtiling mle). Peri v. Los Angeles Junction Railroad Co., 
'.J3 Cal 2d 111, 137 P'2d 441. This universally accepted 
rnle, often called the "collateral source" rule, applies to 
virtually all types of insurance: Health and accident in-
surance, Farb v. Borsuk, 205 Misc 448, 128 NYS:.Zct 41~ 
'1954); Joiner v. Fort, 226 SC 249, 84 SE2d 719, (1954); 
Campbell v. Sutliff 193 Wis 370, 214 NW 374 (1927); HoJ. 
pitalization, Gersick v. Shilling, 97 Cal App 2d 641, 218 P2d 
583 (1950); Roth v. Chatlos, 97 Conn 282, 116 A 332 (19L2J; 
Workman's Compensation Insurance, Sheffield Co. v Phil· 
lips, 69 Ga App 41, 24 SE2d 834 (1943); Coker v. Five-
Two Taxi Service, Inc., 211 Miss 820, 52 So 2d 356 (1951). 
The above cited Gersick case was an automobile ac-
cident case, similar to the case at bar. On cross-examma· 
ti.on defendant's counsel, over objection, was permitted to 
elicit from plaintiff the information that most of her hos. 
pital bills had been paid by Blue Cross, with whom she 
had a policy, and that she had drawn $460.00 from the 
United States Employment Service for disability. The Ap-
pellate Court held that it was error to h:ive admitted this 
testimony. It further noted that total or partial compen-
sation received by an injured party from a collateral 
source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, does not op-
erate to reduce the damages recoverable from the wrong-
doer. The court then went on to note that in thi~ rat· 
ticular case the Judge had remedied his error by fully, 
fairly and properly instructing the jury that if the jury 
found defendant liable, plaintiff was entitled to recover 
for all expenses incurred, and that the amount of damag.cs 
should not be reduced by amounts paid by third parties in 
respect of the damage. Gersick, supra, 218 P2d at 589. 
This kind of instruction was refused in the case at bar. 
thus providing no safeguard against prejudicial use of the 
evidence by the jury. 
The reasoning of the Gersick case was followed in 
the recent Hickenbottom v. Jeppeson, 300 P2d 689, 14:1 
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CA 2d 115. Therein the defendant was similarly allowed 
to elicit from the plaintiff upon cros.s-examination the fact 
that her insurance company had paid a large meastll'e of 
her personal injury expenses. Again the Appellate Court 
stated, "THOSE QUESTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE 
B£EN ALLOWED". (emphasis added). Again, however, 
serious prejudice was avoided by giving proper instruction 
to the jury that they were not to take into consideration 
the fact that plaintiff's insurance company had paid a per-
c:entage of her damages. Again, there is no such exoner-
ating instruction to the jury in the case at bar. Consis-
tent with the authorities there is but one recourse: that 
is tu declare the admisfficm of evidence of Blue C~-Blue 
Shield coverage reversible error. 
In her arguments to the court in respect to the ap-
pellant' s requested instructions which were submitted to 
the cowt in the alternative, the appellant contended that 
the jury was likely to believe that the appellant had been 
reimbursed for the sum she sought as special damage and 
was seeking to m:~over twice. They would be prone to 
believe she was greedy and was deliberately misleading 
the court and jury by not advising them that she had been 
paid once, and that she was seeking to be paid twice for 
the same injury. In the absence of correct instruction, 
the jury might also conclude from the evidence as to pay-
ment by the insurer of special damages that appellant's 
claim for general damages was exaggerated and as a result 
significantly reduce general damages as well. Without ben-
1•fit of the tendered instructions, the jury was almost cer-
tc1inly prejudiced against the appellant by the introduction 
of th~ hospital records indicating payment from a third 
SOUrce. 
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The fears e-'Cpressed by counsel in arguing for the 
requested instructions are confirmed by the judgment. Ap. 
pellant had conclusively proven that she had been severely 
injured, that she had sustained a 10 percent permanent 
disability as related to total body function and that her 
injuries were substantially the result of the first accident. 
It is, therefore, probable that the jury would have found 
substantially greater damages had they not been exposed 
to the evidence complained of, or had they received proper 
instruction. 
POINT 2 
THERE IS NO BASIS IN FACT FOR THlE JURY 
TO HAVE RETURNED A VERDICT OF $500.00 Af5 
SPECIAL DAMAGES. 
A VERDICT IN THIS AMOUNT DEMONSTRATES 
THAT THE JURY FAILED TO CONSIDER TI-IE EVI· 
DENCE AND WERE MOTIVATED BY PASSION, BIAS 
AND PREJUDICE. 
A comparison of the calculations of special damage 
by the parties reveals that the finding of the jury was un-
related to the proof submitted. The amount arrived at 
by the jury can neither be supported from the plaintiff's 
view of the facts, nor from the defendant's view of the 
facts. The verdict with respect to special damages must 
have been either $410.54 or $1291.29. By no rational cal· 
culation based on the evidence could the jury have arrived 
at the figure of $500.00. It is respectfully submitted that 
the figure was arrived at arbitrarily by the jury and prob-
ably represented a token offered to the plaintiff in view 
of payments by a third party. The amount given by the 
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jwy appears to be somewhat related to the amount of 
expenses unpaid by Blue Cross-Blue Shield. It is not 
unlikely that the jury arrived at its figure by deducting 
from appellant's total special damages an amount equiva-
lent to that which was paid by Blue Cross-Blue Shield. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-appellant respectfully urges the Court to grant 
her request for a new trial on the grounds: (1) that the 
trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction re-
garding payments by a third party was prejudicial and 
reversible error and (2) that there was no basis in fact 
for an award of special damages in the amount given. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
JACKSON B. HOW ARD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
